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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 981388-CA
Priority No. 2

ALAN KILSTROM,
Defendant/Appellant

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The

fourteenth

amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution provides in pertinent part:
Section 1. [Citizenship —
protection.]

Due process of law —

Equal

All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1998) provides:
76-6-501. Forgery—"Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose
to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is
facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his
authority or utters any such altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates,
issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so

that the writing or the making, completion, execution,
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or
utterance purports to be the act of another, whether
the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to
have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered
sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a
copy of an original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes
printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any
other method of recording valuable information including
forms such as:
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards,
badges, trademarks, money, and any other symbols of
value, right, privilege, or identification;
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other
instrument or writing issued by a government or any
agency; or
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any
other instrument or writing representing an interest
in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest
in or claim against any person or enterprise.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW,
AND PRESERVATION BELOW
1.

Whether

the

trial

court

erred

in

denying

Mr.

Kihlstrom's motion to dismiss based on insufficient evidence at the
close of the State's case in chief?
Standard of review.
We will affirm a trial court's denial of a
motion to dismiss based upon insufficient evidence "if,
upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can
be reasonably drawn from it, we conclude that some
evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find
that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt." State v. Dibello, 780 P. 2d 1221, 1225
(Utah 1989).
Accord State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222
(Utah 1986);
State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah
Ct.App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).
State v. Davis, 349 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 32 (Utah App. 1998) .
Preserved below by motion to dismiss at R. 124:22-7.

2.

Whether the trial court erred in giving instruction

22, which relieved the State of the obligation of proving that Mr.
Kihlstrom knew the check was forged or had an intent to defraud?
Standard of review.
We review the trial court's instructions to the
jury for correctness, affording no deference. Ames v.
Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993).
When
conducting this analysis, we review the instructions in
their entirety to determine whether the instructions,
when considered as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on
the applicable law.
Id. "We reverse a trial court's
decision on the basis of an instruction improperly
submitted to the jury only where the party challenging
the propriety of the instruction 'demonstrates prejudice
stemming from the instructions viewed in the aggregate.!
" icL (quoting State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah
App.1991), rev'd on other grounds, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah
1993)).
Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Utah App. 1996).
Preserved below at R. 124:68, --95-6.

3.

Whether

the

prosecutor

committed

prejudicial

misconduct in mischaracterizing Mr. Kihlstrom1s prior testimony,
and presenting unsupported innuendo?
Standard of review.
questions

and

determination

argument,
of

whether

In assessing

this

court

the

will

prosecutor

the prosecutor's

make

an

brought

original
improper

information to the jury's attention, and whether such information
probably influenced the jurors.
(Utah 1984) .

State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486

If this court views the evidence of guilt to be

ambiguous or in conflict with other evidence, this court will "more
closely scrutinize the conduct."

Id. When objections are not made

at trial, appellate review is under a "plain error" standard.
3

State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 868
P.2d 95 (Utah 1993).
Preserved below at R. 124:47

(mischaracterizing prior

testimony).

The prosecutor's unsupported innuendo was presented at

R. 124:40.

Unsupported innuendo, while reviewed under the plain

error standard,
is a circumstance "when an error not readily apparent to
the court" does not raise an "insurmountable barrier to
review." State v. Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah
1989) . . . . Unless we apply this exception, this type
of error would always escape review under the obviousness
requirement.
State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 343 (Utah App.), cert denied. 868
P.2d 95 (Utah 1993).

4.

Whether cumulative error mandates reversal?

Standard

of review.

Reversal

is appropriate

if the

cumulative effect of the several errors undermines confidence that
a fair trial was had.

State v. Dunn, 850 P. 2d 1201, 1229 (Utah

1993) .
This is purely an appellate issue, and no preservation is
required beyond that of each individual error asserted.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Mr. Kihlstrom was charged by information with passing a
forged check in violation of the forgery statute, stemming from a
check he cashed in April, 1997.
March 30, 1998.

R. 4-6.

Jury trial was held on

See transcripts, R. 125 (A.M.), 124 (P.M.).

Over

Mr. Kihlstrom1s objection, the trial court gave instruction 22. R.
4

86 (instruction); 124:68, -95-6 (objection).
verdict of guilty.

R. 94.

The jury returned a

Mr. Kihlstrom was sentenced by Judge

Ronald E. Nehring to serve zero to five years in prison.

R. 102-3

(Sentence, Judgment, Commitment, attached as Addendum B) .

This

appeal ensued.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At trial, the State introduced the check in question into
evidence as Exhibit 1.

R. 124:19 (offered), --20 (received).

face amount of the check was $1346.28.

See Exhibit l.1

was written on an account of Furst Construction.
Exhibit 1.

The check

R. 125:101;

The check was made payable to Alan "Kilstrom. "2

124:9, Exhibit 1, see also R. 124:37.

The

R.

Nothing about the check

indicated there was any problem with it.

R. 124:11, see also

Exhibit 1.
Bill Prokopis is the proprietor of Bill's Lounge.

R.

124:3-4, --6. The check was cashed by his employee, Karl Anderson.
R. 124:9.

In accordance with standard procedures, a fingerprint

and driver license information were obtained at the time the check
was indorsed by Mr. Kihlstrom, as well as a social security number.
X

A copy of the check from trial counselfs file is attached as
Addendum A. The actual trial exhibits cannot be located. Neither
the third district court clerk nor the appellate clerk have any
record of ever receiving the exhibits from the trial court. The
court file at R. 51 indicates that 5 exhibits were received. The
trial in this case occurred just prior to the move to the new
Mattheson Courthouse, and one must assume that somewhere in the
move the exhibits have been misplaced.
2

This spelling error seems to be common.
identical error in charging Mr. Kihlstrom.
5

The State made the

R. 124:4-5, --6-8, --9-10.
124:4.

The check was returned unpaid.

Furst Construction was then notified.

R. 124:11.

R.
Vern

Beesley, a Deputy Sheriff assigned to the crime lab, testified that
the fingerprint on the check came from Mr. Kihlstrom's right index
finger.

R. 124:12-19.
John Johanssen, the corporate controller and financial

officer of Furst Construction

(R. 125:96),

testified

company had some checks stolen.

R. 125:98, --103.

that the

In the fall of

1996 about 12 of these checks showing up on their bank statement as
having cleared the bank.

R, 125:98.

Furst Construction put a stop

payment order on the 18,000 series of checks, R. 125:99, --104, and
closed the account, R. 125:99. Exhibit 1 is from the 18,000 series
of checks.

R. 125:104, Exhibit 1 (check number is 18871).

three persons were authorized
125:100.

signatories

Only

on the checks.

R.

The signature of the maker on Exhibit 1 did not belong to

any of the authorized signatories.

R. 125:100.

Mr. Kihlstrom

never worked for Furst Construction or received a check from them.
R.

125:101.

Mr.

Kihlstrom

was

not

one

of

the

two

or

more

individuals prosecuted for forging the stolen checks from that
series.

R. 125:103.
At

this point, the

State

rested.

Kihlstrom's motion to dismiss was denied.

R.

124:20.

Mr.

R. 124:22-27.

Mr. Kihlstrom testified that during the spring of 1997,
he worked as a self-employed mechanic at his home. R. 124:28.

A

friend referred Mike Workman to him, and Workman solicited him to
work on several vehicles.

R. 124:29.
6

Workman had Mr. Kihlstrom

replace a head gasket and water pump in a full-size Chevy crew cab
pickup,

which

had

construction truck.
about a week.

signs

on

the

side

and

appeared

R. 124:31.

a

Workman paid Mr. Kihlstrom with the

couple days later Mr. Kihlstrom

Lounge.

be

R. 124:29-31. Mr. Kihlstrom had the truck for

check at issue, which had already been filled out.
A

to

R. 124:32-3.

cashed the check at Bill's

R. 124:33. Mr. Kihlstrom presented his Wyoming commercial

driver's license as identification.

R. 124:34-5.

Nothing about

the transaction seemed to be out of the ordinary.

R. 124:35-6.

Mr. Kihlstrom denied any knowledge that the check was stolen, or
that the maker's signature was forged.

R. 124:46, --52.

Over objection, R. 124:68, --95-6, the trial court gave
instruction 22, which provided:
Intent to defraud is simply a purpose to use a
false writing as if it were genuine in order to gain some
advantage.
A false writing has such an obvious tendency to
accomplish fraud that you may infer such intent from the
mere creation of an instrument that is false.
R. 86.
In

cross-examining

Mr.

Kihlstrom,

the

prosecutor

questioned him in part as follows:
Q
Okay.
When did you realize that the police
were looking for you in connection with this check?
A
When I did -- I didn't know anything about this
until I was arrested on a different warrant.
Q
Well, on this particular case weren't you aware
in late May or early June that Detective Doug Townsend
wanted to talk to you in connection with this check?
A
No.
Q
He didn't go to your house? Weren't you living
with a young woman at the time, a Jenny, is it Tangloon?
A
Tangloon. No, I wasn't, not at that time.
Q
She didn't tell Officer Townsend [sic] that
they were looking for you in late May or early June?
7

A
Q

I haven't talked to her for over a year.
Well, where were you in late May and early
June? Were you out of state or in state?
A
I was in state.
Q
You were here. Were you ever trying to hide
from the police in connection with this case?
A
Not at all.
Q
And you say you never learned about the check
until when?
A
December.
Q
December of 1997?
A
Yes, sir.
R. 124:40-41. The prosecutor never offered any evidence in support
of this unsupported innuendo.
Later, the prosecutor mischaracterized Mr. Kihlstrom's
prior testimony:
Q
A
Q
A
Q

How many times did Mike Workman pay you?
Two times.
Two times?
Yes.
Didn't you just tell the jury it was only one

time?
A

No.
MS. REMAL: Objection, Your Honor. That's a
mischaracterization of the evidence.
He answered the
questions that counsel[] asked.
THE COURT: Overruled. It's cross-examination.
Q
Didn't you just a few minutes ago tell us that
that was the only time he ever paid you?
A
No, I didn't.
Q
So now he did pay you twice?
A

Yeah.

R. 124:47.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Kihlstrom's motion
to dismiss at the close of the State's case in chief.

The State

presented no evidence that Mr. Kihlstrom knew the check was forged,
or that he had an intent to defraud.

The State only established

that Mr. Kihlstrom negotiated a check made out to him, and that
8

that

check

later proved

to be

establish the criminal mens rea,

a

forgery.

Having

failed

to

the denial of his dismissal motion

should be reversed and a judgment of acquittal entered.
The trial court erred in giving instruction 22, which
permitted the jury to infer an intent to defraud on the part of an
utterer from the mere fact that the instrument he uttered is a
forgery.

This inference is irrational and arbitrary, in violation

of due process.

This instruction had the effect of relieving the

State of its burden of proving intent beyond a reasonable doubt,
allowing conviction for innocent action. This Court should reverse
and order a new trial.
The

prosecutor

committed

prejudicial

misconduct

in

offering unsupported innuendo and mischaracterizing Mr. Kihlstrom's
prior

testimony.

This

misconduct

adversely

impacted

Mr.

Kihlstrom!s credibility, which was necessary for his defense of
being a holder in due course with no knowledge of the forgery.
Absent this misconduct, a better result is likely.

This Court

should reverse and order a new trial.
Cumulatively, the instructional error and prosecutorial
misconduct undermine confidence in the verdict, necessitating a new
trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
MR. KIHLSTROM'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CLOSE
OF THE STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF.
Fully marshalled, the State's evidence in its case in
chief showed the following:
9

1.

Some unidentified person or persons stole checks from

Furst Construction Co.
2.

R. 125:98, --103.

Some unidentified person or persons made out one of the

stolen checks to Alan Kihlstrom, and affixed a maker's signature to
the

check.

See

Exhibit

1; R.

125:100

(check

not

signed

by

authorized signatory).
3.
with it.
4.

Nothing about the check indicated there was any problem
R. 124:11.
Alan Kihlstrom came into possession of the stolen and

forged check.

(Reasonable inference from his later action of

cashing the check.)
5.

Alan Kihlstrom cashed the check at Bill's Lounge in a

nondeceptive, commercially reasonable fashion including indorsing
his own name on the back of the check, providing a state-issued
picture ID, and providing a thumbprint.

See Exhibit 1; R. 124:4-

10.
6.

Payment on the check was stopped.

See Exhibit 1; R.

124:4.
There is nothing in this evidence indicating that Mr.
Kihlstrom

forged

the check, or that he knew the check was a

forgery.
The forgery statute provides:
76-6-501. Forgery—"Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose
to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is
facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his
authority or utters any such altered writing; or
10

(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates,
issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so
that the writing or the making, completion, execution,
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or
utterance purports to be the act of another, whether
the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to
have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered
sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a
copy of an original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes
printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any
other method of recording valuable information including
forms such as:
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards,
badges, trademarks, money, and any other symbols of
value, right, privilege, or identification;
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other
instrument or writing issued by a government or any
agency; or
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any
other instrument or writing representing an interest
in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest
in or claim against any person or enterprise.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501

(Supp. 1998).

Utah ! s forgery statute incorporates the elements of two
common

law crimes:

instrument.
forgery

Without

here.

common

law forgery,

question,

someone

and uttering
committed

The check was completed,

with

a

forged

a common

a forged

law

maker's

signature.

" [T] he essence of the crime of forgery is not the end,

i.e., what

is obtained by the forgery, but the means, e.g., by

signing the name of another with intent to defraud."
Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 391 n.14 (Utah App. 1997).

State v.

The State did

not allege or prove that Mr. Kihlstrom forged the check.

He can

only be guilty of a crime for his own actions.
The essence of the crime charged against Mr. Kihlstrom
was at common law called uttering a forged instrument.
qualifies as a writing under subsection
11

(2)(a).

A "check"

As for the

actus

reus,

there is little question that Mr. Kihlstrom transferred or

uttered the check to Bill's Lounge.

Significantly, nothing Mr.

Kihlstrom did purported to be anything other than his own action.
When he transferred or uttered the check, he purported to do so as
Al an

Kihlstrom.

identification,

He
and

signed
affixed

his
his

own
own

name,

provided

fingerprint.

his

He

own

merely

"negotiated"3 the "instrument"4 by "indorsing"5 it and transferring
possession to Bill's Lounge.
investigate

Mr. Kihlstrom was under no duty to

the validity of the check.

" [I]n the absence of

anything to warn him to the contrary, he may assume that persons
with whom he deals are themselves acting honestly and in good
faith."

Jaeger and Branch, Inc. v. Pappas, 433 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah

1967) .
Utah law expressly recognizes and protects the status of
a "holder in due course."

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-302 (1997).

The

check at issue here was issued to Mr. Kihlstrom, and did not bear
such apparent evidence of forgery as to call its authenticity into
question.

Mr.

Kihlstrom

took

the

instrument

for value

(his

mechanic services), in good faith, without notice that the maker's
signature was unauthorized.

He is a holder in due course.

The State put on no evidence establishing satisfaction of
the intent element required by § 76-6-501(1), that the act be
committed "with purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that
3

See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-201 (1997).

4

See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-104 (1997).

5

See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-204 (1997).
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he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone."
reasonable

inferences

exist

to

establish

that

element.

Kihlstrom used his own name, identification, and fingerprint.

No
Mr.
A

reasonable person possessing a check made out to himself as payee
will either negotiate that check for cash, or deposit it into a
bank account he owns.

"The act of passing as true an instrument is

not one from which guilty knowledge can be inferred."
State, 486 S.W.2d 97, 102 (Tex. Cr. App. 1972).

Albrecht v.

"Indeed, to hold

otherwise would create the danger that the unknowing and accidental
passing of a forged instrument could effectively become a strict
liability offense."

Parks v. State, 746 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. Cr.

App. 1987) (en banc).
There

are

finite

limits

to

the

intent

that

may

inferred from the commission of an act:
"The law can presume the intention so far as realized in
the act, but not an intention beyond what was so
realized. The law does not presume, because an assault
was made with a weapon likely to produce death, that it
was an assault with the intent to murder. And where it
takes a particular intent to constitute a crime, that
particular intent must be proved either by direct or
circumstantial
evidence, which would warrant
the
inference of the intent with which the act was done. "
Thacker[v. Commonwealth, 114 S.E. 504, 505 (Va. 1922).]
This Court has in the past acknowledged the
fact that criminal intent is seldom proved by direct
evidence but must be instead inferred
from the
circumstances of the given facts. Nonetheless, we have
also cautioned that the act in itself does not raise the
presumption that it was done with the specific intent
required to prove the offense. All the
circumstances,

when taken together, must admit of no other
hypothesis
than that of guilt to warrant

reasonable
conviction.

State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229 (1980), and cases cited
therein.
State v. Manus, 93 N.M. 95, 597 P.2d 280
(1979). See also State v. Whittincrhill. 109 Utah 48, 163

13

be

P.2d 342 (1945), applying that rationale to an assault
with intent to rape.
State v. Castoncruay, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326

(Utah 1983)

(emphasis

added) .
Here, an alternate reasonable hypothesis is indisputably
present.

Where an individual is the payee on a check, the act of

negotiating that check by itself permits the innocent inference
that

the

individual

instrument.

intended

to

collect

the

value

of

that

No knowledge that the instrument is forged may be

inferred, nor any intent to defraud.
The

evidence

here was

insufficient

justify submission of the case to the jury.

as

to

intent

to

The trial court should

have granted Mr. Kihlstrom's motion to dismiss.

There was no

evidence from which criminal intent could be inferred.
A jury verdict is reversed only if ""the evidence . . .
is

[so] sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that

reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.'"

State

v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Petree,
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)).

Here, reasonable minds must have

entertained a doubt that the check was negotiated to perpetuate a
fraud, rather than merely as a good faith attempt to collect on a
negotiable instrument.

This Court should reverse, and enter a

judgment of acquittal.
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POINT

11.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING
INSTRUCTION 22, WHICH RELIEVED THE STATE OF
THE OBLIGATION OF PROVING THAT MR. KIHLSTROM
KNEW THE CHECK WAS FORGED OR HAD AN INTENT TO
DEFRAUD.

Under the forgery statute, one irrefutable element of
forgery is that the act be committed

"with purpose to defraud

anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be
perpetrated by anyone." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1995) . Over
Mr. Kihlstrom's objection, R.

124:68,

--95-6, the trial

court

instructed the jury:
Intent to defraud is simply a purpose to use a
false writing as if it were genuine in order to gain some
advantage.
A false writing has such an obvious tendency to
accomplish fraud that you may infer such intent from the
mere creation of an instrument that is false.
R. 86.
This

instruction

was

error.

Certainly,

"the

mere

creation of an instrument that is false" evidences an intent to
defraud and knowledge of the forgery on the

part

of

the

forger.

Instruction 22 would be appropriate in any prosecution for common
law forgery, i.e,. where the person who actually supplied the false
signature is on trial. Mere creation says nothing about the intent
of each additional person who comes in contact with the forged
instrument, and might be charged with uttering a forged instrument.
This instruction had the effect of permitting the jury to treat
uttering a forged instrument as a strict liability offense -intent is inferred from the mere creation of the false writing.
Anyone coming into contact with the false writing and passing it

15

along, even though innocently done, becomes guilty of uttering a
forged instrument.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 requires specific

intent -- "with purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that
he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone."

The jury

was relieved of its burden of proving intent beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The

inference

created

by

Instruction

22

is

unconstitutional:
[A] criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as
'irrational' or 'arbitrary,' and hence unconstitutional,
unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance
that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow
from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.
Learv v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 1548, 23
L.Ed.2d 57 (1969).

Citizens routinely receive checks without any

knowledge or ability to determine if the signatures on them are
genuine.
contrary,

"[I]n

the

he may

absence

assume

of

anything

to warn

that persons with whom

themselves acting honestly and in good faith."
Inc. v. Pappas, 433 P.2d 605, 607

him

he

to

the

deals

are

Jaeger and Branch,

(Utah 1967) .

Nothing about

Exhibit 1 would place a person of ordinary caution on notice that
the maker's signature had been forged.
From the mere existence of a fact, it is not more likely
than not that the entire world is aware of that fact.

Instruction

22 creates just such an inference, which is not warranted.
intent

to defraud

can only be inferred

knowledge that the instrument is forged.

if the individual

has

Knowledge of the forgery

cannot be inferred from the mere existence of the forgery.
16

An

"The

act of passing as true an instrument is not one from which guilty
knowledge can be inferred."
(Tex. Cr. App. 1972) .
danger

that

Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97, 102

"Indeed, to hold otherwise would create the

the unknowing

and accidental passing of a

forged

instrument could effectively become a strict liability offense."
Parks v. State, 746 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987) (en banc) .
Instruction 22 came from State v. Gonzalez, 822 P. 2d 1214
(Utah App. 1991).

See R. 124:95-6.

In Gonzalez, Ms. Gonzalez

possessed the checkbook of a "Christie Cotner."

She made out a

check, signed "Christie Cotner" to it, and attempted to pay for
merchandise with it.

822 P. 2d at 1215.

The Court cited with

approval State v. May, 461 P.2d 126, 128 (Id. 1969), quoting the
language contained in Instruction 22.
In the context of Gonzalez, where the defendant is the
maker of the check, such language is eminently reasonable.

Having

just made out the check and signed another person' s name to it, it
is reasonable to infer an intent to defraud.

Similarly, in May the

defendant forged his father's signature as cosigner on a note so
that he could obtain a loan.
defraud may be inferred

May, 461 P. 2d at 127.

The intent to

from his act of forging his

father's

signature.
This reasoning is inapplicable here.

Both Gonzalez and

May involved what at common law was termed forgery.

The instant

case only involves what at common law was termed uttering a forged
instrument.

In

this

context,

one
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may

still

infer

that

the

unidentified forger had an intent to defraud, but no inference may
be drawn concerning the intent of the utterer, Mr. Kihlstrom.
Mr. Kihlstrom has been prejudiced.

The State presented

no evidence showing that he actually knew the check was forged.
The defense theory was that Mr. Kihlstrom received the check as
payment for work he performed as a self employed mechanic.
125:93-5 (opening statement), 124:28-36, --46, --52.

R.

Instruction

22 permitted the jury to infer criminal intent from the undisputed
fact that the check was forged.

Mr. Kihlstrom was thus convicted

without any proof that he possessed the necessary criminal
rea.
there

mens

Absent the improper inference permitted by Instruction 22,
is

a

reasonable

probability

that

he

would

have

been

acquitted.

POINT III.
THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
MISCONDUCT
IN
MISCHARACTERIZING
MR.
KIHLSTROM'S PRIOR TESTIMONY, AND INTRODUCING
UNSUPPORTED INNUENDO.
The

prosecutor

committed

cross-examination of Mr. Kihlstrom.

repeated

misconduct

He introduced

in

unsupported

innuendo:
Q
Okay.
When did you realize that the police
were looking for you in connection with this check?
A
When I did -- I didn't know anything about this
until I was arrested on a different warrant.
Q
Well, on this particular case weren't you aware
in late May or early June that Detective Doug Townsend
wanted to talk to you in connection with this check?
A
No.
Q
He didn't go to your house? Weren't you living
with a young woman at the time, a Jenny, is it Tangloon?
A
Tangloon. No, I wasn't, not at that time.
Q
She didn't tell Officer Townsend [sic] that
they were looking for you in late May or early June?
18

his

A
Q

I haven't talked to her for over a year.
Well, where were you in late May and early
June? Were you out of state or in state?
A
I was in state.
Q
You were here. Were you ever trying to hide
from the police in connection with this case?
A
Not at all.
Q
And you say you never learned about the check
until when?
A
December.
Q
December of 1997?
A
R. 124:40-41.

Yes, sir.
The prosecutor failed to prove up his unsupported

innuendo with evidence that Mr. Kihlstrom was aware in May or June
that Detective Townsend was looking for him, that the detective
went to Mr. Kihlstrom's house, that Mr. Kihlstrom was living with
Jenny Tangloon, that she told him the detective was looking for
him, or that he evaded the police.
Later, the prosecutor mischaracterized Mr. Kihlstrom's
prior testimony:
Q
A
Q
A
Q

How many times did Mike Workman pay you?
Two times.
Two times?
Yes.
Didn't you just tell the jury it was only one

time?
A

No.
MS. REMAL: Objection, Your Honor. That's a
mischaracterization of the evidence.
He answered the
questions that counsel[] asked.
THE COURT: Overruled. It's cross-examination.
Q
Didn't you just a few minutes ago tell us that
that was the only time he ever paid you?
A
No, I didn't.
Q
So now he did pay you twice?
A
Yeah.
R. 124:47.
The Utah Supreme Court has established a two prong test
for reversals for improper statements of counsel:
19

The test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so
objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal case
is, did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors
matters which they would not be justified in considering
in determining their verdict, and were they, under the
circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced
by those remarks.
State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426

(Utah 1973); accord State v.

Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984), State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48
(Utah 1983), overruled on other grounds in State v. Roberts, 711
P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985), State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750 (Utah
1982), State v. Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1976).
If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their
weighing conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible of
differing interpretations, there is a greater likelihood
that they will be improperly influenced through remarks
of counsel.
Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may be
searching for guidance in weighing and interpreting the
evidence.
They may be especially susceptible to
influence, and a small degree of influence may be
sufficient to affect the verdict.
State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984).
A.

Each of
jurors'

attention

considering.

His

THE PROSECUTOR DREW THE JURORS' ATTENTION
TO MATTERS THEY WERE NOT OTHERWISE
JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING.
the prosecutor's
to

matters

questioning

improper

they

were

concerning

comments
not

how

drew

the

justified

in

many

times

Mr.

Kihlstrom was paid entirely mischaracterized the actual evidence
presented.

The prosecutor attempted to brand Mr. Kihlstrom a liar

based on testimony that he never gave.
The questioning concerning Detective Townsend's efforts
to contact Mr. Kihlstrom was improper unsupported innuendo.

The

possibility that the jury credited the prosecution with having
20

evidence concerning Mr. Kihlstrom evading the police that it did
not present at trial is palpable.

"The insinuation that other

evidence exists encourages the jury to determine its verdict based
upon evidence outside the record and jeopardizes a defendant's
right to a trial based upon the evidence presented."

State v.

Young, 853 P. 2d 327, 349 (Utah 1993) (finding plain error, but
failing to find prejudice).
B.

THE OBVIOUSNESS PRONG OF PLAIN ERROR IS
NOT APPLIED TO UNSUPPORTED INNUENDO
CLAIMS.

Unsupported innuendo, while reviewed under the plain
error standard,
is a circumstance "when an error not readily apparent to
the court" does not raise an "insurmountable barrier to
review." State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah
1989) . . . . Unless we apply this exception, this type
of error would always escape review under the obviousness
requirement.
State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 343 (Utah App.), cert denied, 868
P. 2d 95 (Utah 1993).

At the time the prosecutor introduced the

unsupported innuendo, defense counsel had no way of knowing that he
would fail to offer evidence in support in his rebuttal case. An
objection would have been premature.

The obviousness does not

present a barrier to review here.
C.

MR. KIHLSTROM WAS PREJUDICED.

Each instance of prosecutorial misconduct attacked and
impugned

the

credibility

of

Mr.

Kihlstrom.

Absent

the

prosecution's improper argument, there is a reasonable probability
that the jury would have credited Mr. Kihlstrom's testimony and
found him not guilty.
21

Critical
credibility

to Mr.

with

the

Kihlstrom's

jury

concerning

possession of the forged check.
prosecutor

tried

to establish

defense

was

how

came

he

maintaining
to

be

There was no confession.
that Mr. Kihlstrom

lied

in
The

in his

testimony concerning the timing of a second check, R. 124:51-2,
--56,

but

confused.

it

is

equally

likely

that

Mr.

Kihlstrom

was

just

The prosecutor's misconduct impugned Mr. Kihlstrom's

credibility by implying that the State had evidence that he had
evaded

arrest

and

was

lying

Townsend was looking for him.

about

whether

he

knew

Detective

The prosecutor also implied that Mr.

Kihlstrom had lied concerning how many times he was paid by Mr.
Workman.

Absent the prosecutor's misconduct, it is more likely

that Mr. Kihlstrom would have been believed and acquitted.

This

Court should reverse, and remand for further proceedings.

POINT IV. CUMULATIVELY, THE ERRORS HERE UNDERMINE
CONFIDENCE IN THE VERDICT.
Reversal

is appropriate

if the cumulative

effect

of

several errors undermines confidence that a fair trial was had.
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) .
operation

of

Instruction

22

and

undermine confidence in the verdict.

the

Here, the joint

prosecutor's

misconduct

The prosecutor's misconduct

undermined Mr. Kihlstrom's credibility, and made it less likely
that the jury would credit his testimony that he received the
forged check in good faith for services rendered, without knowledge
that it was forged.

Instruction 22 permitted the jury to infer an

intent to defraud from Mr. Kihlstrom's innocent receipt of the
22

forged check. Collectively, absent these errors a better result is
probable.
CONCLUSION
Based

on

the

foregoing, Mr. Kihlstrom

respectfully

requests that this court reverse the trial court's denial of his
motion to dismiss, and order that a judgment of acquittal be
entered. Alternatively, Mr. Kihlstrom requests that his conviction
be reversed, and this matter remanded for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £)

day of December, 1998.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

LISA J. REMAL
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A
FORGED CHECK (EXHIBIT 1)
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ADDENDUM B
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT (R. 102-3)

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCING
CHANGE OF PLEA
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 971010775 FS

ALAN KILSTROM,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

RONALD E NEHRING
June 5, 1998

PRESENT
Clerk:
lindaps
Prosecutor: RICH HAMP
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): LISA J. REMAL
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 19, 1962
Video
Tape Number:
124341
CHARGES
1. FORGERY - 3rd Degree FelonyPlea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 06/05/1998 Guilty
HEARING
TAPE: 124341 On record - This matter comes now before the Court for
Sentencing.
Defendant is commited to the Utah State Prison forthwith.
The Court orders Defendant to pay restitution in the amount of
$2,668.28.

Page 1

Case No: 971010775
Date:
Jun 05, 1998
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Credit is granted for time served.
Credit is granted for 158 day(s) previously served.
Dated this ;5-

day of

N/^tA^
#

RONALQ^E^
Distroct^C©urt' j£dge
**•*•—s*?5
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